Abstract: Exercising command and control (C2) during naval distributed lethality (DL) operations presents
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Navy introduced a new concept to improve combat efficiency via localized sea control through an increase in the offensive power of individual components of the surface force operating as part of a surface action group (SAG). DL is the condition gained by increasing the offensive power of individual components of the surface force (cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships (LCSs), amphibious ships, and logistics ships) and then employing them in dispersed offensive formations known as "hunter-killer SAGs. [1] Distributed lethality uses a concept called the adaptive force package (AFP) that is structured for subordinate commands to join efforts and strengths during coordinated maritime operations. The AFP is a task group of surface and subsurface combatants, USN auxiliary support ships (USNS), associated aircraft, and unmanned craft [2] . Each AFP is tailored based on the platforms that are available for tasking and the mission to be accomplished. Naval command and control (C2) must function within these AFPs when operating as part of a distributed lethality SAG. C2 as employed in operations with permissive communications environments was not architected to support this type of mission; therefore, a need exists to model C2 methods and architectures to better understand and ultimately improve the capability of naval forces operating under the distributed lethality concept. This paper addresses and answers the following questions:
• What is C2 support for distributed lethality in terms of the systems architecture?
• How can the Navy employ C2 support for distributed lethality?
• How effective are C2 systems architectures in support of distributed lethality?
II. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
We define, develop, and assess C2 support for DL in terms of systems architecture development.
This effort is constrained to focusing on a specific operational concept,
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th Annual IEEE International Systems Conference, April 8-11, 2019 in Orlando Abstract and paper submission: Nov 17, 2018 and subsequent mission and potential scenarios, which requires the deployment of one or more multi-platform AFPs as necessary during the overall mission. The functions and activities performed by the AFP to achieve mission success in the conduct of DL are defined through the development of a functional architecture as part of the overall systems architecture similar to current proposed functionality for organic over the horizon targeting for the 2025 surface fleet [3] . We evaluate various physical solutions and include a breadth of options spanning doctrine, tactics, organization and command structure, the requirement for support ships or other support platforms, and the combinations of platforms and systems that make up the AFPs. This effort develops a requirements architecture to allocate system functions to system components from the physical architecture and to provide an initial, subjective assessment of how well the system functions are addressed.
We implement DL through four interrelated concepts: the AFP; localized C2 within the AFP; a robust operations order; and assured communications with higher headquarters, typically a maritime operations center (MOC) located ashore or afloat (onboard a large command level ship). These concepts are illustrated at a high level by the DODAF operational viewpoint (OV-1) in Figure 1 . Satellite communications may be intermittent, isolated to one platform in the AFP, or completely non-existent. A functioning tactical data link is essential for localized APF C2 [4] . C2 authority over the AFP must be local when reliable external communications are not available. [5] Our scenario assumes that satellite communications across the AFP are denied by the adversary early into a conflict or restricted to a single platform. A lack of reliable long-range communications to higher headquarters means that localized C3 is key to the success of the AFP. We investigate if tactical datalinks organic to the AFP can allow sharing of enough tactical C3 information and weapons queueing to perform the mission. Each AFP component commanding officer can fight their unit as a whole while coordinating with the other units of the AFP to do tasks such as cooperative engagement or coordinated fires.
III. C2 NETWORK ARCHITECTURES
Three communications network architectures are modeled for physical architecture comparisons; centralized, decentralized, and distributed [6] . The network architectures of a five platform AFP are illustrated in Figure 2 , Figure 3 , and Figure 4 . Note that waveforms are assumed to accommodate interoperability with both USN and, when necessary, coalition forces [7] . In the decentralized C2 network architecture of Figure 4 , platform 2 is the central node connecting all platforms into a single decentralized network. Multiple redundant communication transport paths exist. Loss of one path to any node does not severely degrade the intra-AFP communications network. Loss of any node, other than 2, only impacts the lost node. Loss of the node at platform 2 splits the network into two separated networks. Under this network, any platform may be the AFP commander.
The decentralized network physical architecture should include a smart command and control processor (C2P) to route messages via the fastest available transport path. Network protocols and C2 messaging design should accommodate multiple copies of redundant transmissions when routing messages. A five-node decentralized communications network could result in one original C2 message and three duplicate copies of the original message.
For example; platform 1 addresses a C2 message to platform 3 and transmits the message via both available paths to platform 2 and 4 (without smart C2P). Platform 2 forwards the message via both available paths to platform 3 and 5. Platform 3 receives the original message at the same time platform 5 receives the duplicate message from platform 2. Platform 5 forwards the duplicate message to platform 3. Simultaneously, platform 2 receives a duplicate of the original message from platform 4 and forwards two copies to platform 3 and 5, resulting in platform 3 receiving the original C2 message and three duplicate copies.
Network routing is beyond the scope of this study. Network routing is highlighted here as a need for additional study to optimize network design with smart network C2P routing that minimizes copies of message traffic, minimizes transport time/costs, and provides a robust message processing design in the event of duplicate messages. A smart C2P architecture would sense the network routing paths and route the C2 message only from platform 1 to 2 to 3. A secondary benefit of smart routing is a reduction in RF radiations by eliminating redundant transmissions by AFP platforms.
Transport cost when platform 2 is AFP commander is a single hop for point-to-point waveform communications or two hops when airborne relays are required. Transport cost when any platform other than platform 2 is AFP commander is two to four hops for point-to-point waveform communications or four hops when airborne relays are required. In the distributed C2 network architecture of Figure 4 , no central node exists. The maximum number of redundant communication transport paths exist. Loss of a single path to any node does not severely degrade the intra-AFP communications network. Loss of any node only impacts the lost node. Under this network, any platform may be the AFP commander. The distributed network should employ smart C2P routing to function via fastest transport path and provide a robust message processing design in the event of duplicate messages. Transport cost when platform 2 is AFP commander is a single hop for point-to-point waveform communications or two hops when airborne relays are required. Transport cost when any platform other than platform 2 is AFP commander is two to four hops for pointto-point waveform communications or four hops when airborne relays are required.
IV. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
Distrusted Lethality has been demonstrated in practice using traditional remote centralized C2 [8] . We compared the three alternative types of network architectures (centralized, decentralized and distributed) to assess the potential operational impact of varied network architectures. Test This test case focuses on the network architecture performance under a simulated contested spectrum environment between the AFP platforms nodes. For this test case, the C2 message dropout rate parameter was changed to a uniform distribution that varies from 0 to 100. 50 random samples were chosen from the distribution and used for each network type. Each sample was used as an input parameter for a single run. Therefore, the simulations were run 50 times for each network type. All the other simulation parameters remained constant. The message dropout rate network architecture results are in Figure 5 . Figure 5 illustrates that message dropout probability has a significant impact on C2 delivery success. To compare the networks, a paired t-test analysis was performed for this test case because each network type had the same input parameters. Based on the P-values in Table 2 , we can conclude the C2 message delivery time and time from request to engagement metrics are statistically significant between the network architectures. As a result, it can be determined that the distributed network architecture performs the best followed closely by decentralized networks. Centralized networks have the lowest performance. This test case analyzes the effects of changing the command authority level and its ability to exchange C2 messages in a simulated contested spectrum environment. The test case changes the command authority from HHQ to the AFP commander and looks at the impact of this change to the C2 message dropout rate. Test case 4 executed two separate runs. In the first run, all parameters were constant with the only variant factor being the decision authority. The simulations ran ten times for each authority type. In the second run, the C2 message dropout rate parameter was altered by changing it to a uniform distribution with variance from 0 to 100%. 50 random samples were chosen from the distribution and used for each command authority. Each sample was used as an input parameter for a single run. Therefore, the simulations were run 50 times for each command authority. The distributed network architecture is employed and all other simulation parameters remained constant. The output simulation results for the command authority are shown in Table 3 and Figure 6 . Figure 6 shows that the message dropout probability has a significant impact on C2 delivery success. The plot also shows that for networks in which the AFP is the command authority, the performance is significantly better in terms of C2 message delivery as the message dropout probability increases.
A design of experiments (DOE) is performed based on the simulation parameters. The DOE analysis provides some insight into which of the simulation parameters effect the simulation output metrics. A full factorial DOE was used, requiring 288 runs. The DOE factors and values are shown in Table 4 . Figure 7 shows the time from request to engagement response sensitivity analysis and P-values of all the factors. Based on Figure 7 , we can conclude multiple factors are statistically significant for time from request to engagement. Between these factors, the log worth analysis shows that the time from request to engagement is most sensitive to the C2 processing time at HHQ and the AFP. Therefore, decreasing the time it takes commanders and HHQ to process C2 messages will have the biggest impact in decreasing the time from request to engagement.
The geographical dispersion of naval forces operating under the distributed lethality concept introduces operational challenges to traditional C2 across an AFP due to the long distances required for communications, the anticipated disruption of satellite communications, and the relatively close proximity of opposing forces. Tactical C2 systems must be flexible to support changing communication architectures. Operational C2 must be flexible to work within the boundaries of the available communication architectures. This research project employs MBSE methods to better understand and improve the capability of naval forces operating under the distributed lethality concept.
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
C2 Network Architecture
The use of MBSE and statistical analysis of computer simulation of C2 network architectures confirms the hypothesis that a distributed mesh architecture is the most robust for distributed lethality C2 networks.
C2 Process Model
MBSE identifies possible efficiencies to the traditional C2 process model that can improve the effectiveness of C2 when operating within the constraints of distributed lethality. Statistical analysis of computer simulation of C2 networks and process models confirms the benefit.
Advanced Tactical Data Links
Review of available and near future advanced tactical data links finds no 100% solution in a single system. Additionally, the distributed lethality AFP needs multiple tactical data link options to build a distributed mesh network architecture. The need for interoperability among all APF platforms requires common data links. USN, USNS, joint and coalition forces will potentially participate in distributed lethality operations as part of an AFP.
Platforms without common datalinks must be modified to add this capability if they are to participate in the AFP C2 network. Advanced tactical data links must be interoperable on Link 16 and Link 22 to meet the joint and coalition interoperability requirement. AFP C2 systems should include provisions for the joint range extension protocol (JREAP) for use when IP networks or satellite communications are available.
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